analysis. We analyze reported insider trading behavior and explain the association between corporate as well as 3rd-party news announcements on directors' dealings activity. Previous approaches are extended by adding the sentiment of news to the research setting. We find strong evidence that insiders follow the stock market adage "Buy on bad news, sell on good news": They tend to buy (sell) securities in those years where their respective companies issue negative (positive) news. Likewise, insiders tend to buy (sell) stocks in years when 3rd-party news coverage is pessimistic (optimistic). The impact of corporate news on insider trading is higher than for 3rd-party news, as corporate news are subject to direct influence by the insiders. We also find that insiders buy when next year's news improves compared to the current year. Looking more concretely into the language, we also demonstrate that insiders buy when expressing insecurity and uncertainty. Overall, the findings reveal additional insights for insider trading analysis and demonstrate how finance may benefit from textual analysis.
Introduction
Literature is providing evidence that the way corporate news announcements are phrased plays an important role in the capital markets. Indisputably, news carries valuable qualitative information that may influence investor's expectations about firm's future performance (Tetlock et. al, 2008 ).
Prior financial literature on textual analysis often investigates the relationship between the tone of news -in this context often dubbed 'sentiment' -and its relation to company performance and capital market reactions such as stock price returns, trading volumes and These news announcements are formulated within the company by executives or outside the company by third parties such as analysts. By law, executives are banned from trading based on unpublished superior material information about the company that may significantly impact the stock prices. However, there are neither clear definitions of material information nor clear regulations of how long in advance before a piece of news is revealed for which directors are not permitted to trade in their shares 1 . Regardless of whether the news about a company comes from within or from outside a company, there are no strict or binding rules and guidance on the linguistic context with which news need to be written. Each piece of corporate news reveals an important fact about a company and the mix of words used determines the strength and the tone of news. Thus, reader's perception and view of the company's current position and future prospects are influenced. In companies where executives are shareholders, executives may strategically use their discretion in formulating news in order to influence the stock prices and subsequently exploit these stock price movements by own trading activities. When news about a company is announced by a third party, it impacts the perception of all investors including executives about the company's current position and future prospects. Accordingly, directors lose the insider advantage as news is novel to all investors equally.
From the past literature, it is known that executives trade around different corporate news announcements such as takeover bids (Seyhun, 1990) , seasoned equity offerings (Karpoff & Lee, 1991) , bankruptcy filings (Seyhun & Bradley, 1997) or earnings announcements (Ke, Huddart & Petron, 2003) . In this way, insiders manage to outperform the market by earning abnormal returns from their trades. Ke Other studies find evidence that actively trading executives not only benefit from their superior knowledge, but also actively influence corporate disclosures. Aboody & Kasznik, (2000) find that executives tend to release bad news before stock option grants to fix lower strike prices. Vice versa, executives release very positive news before stock option exercises to obtain higher sales prices (Brockman, Martin & Puckett 2010) . Similarly, executives who intend to buy shares for their own account tend to release bad news in the period just before their insider purchases (Cheng & Lo 2006) . This insider trading pattern could appear to be another example of contrarian trading, but it also could represent active manipulation of stock market prices.
Our paper extends literature in four ways: First, while 'good' and 'bad' news have been used as explanatory variable for insider trading, 'good' or 'bad' was always measured by the sign of abnormal returns around the news. However, the actual textual and qualitative content of the news has never been part of the analysis. Since the capabilities of textual analysis and news sentiment are not limited to stock price prediction, we use it to measure whether news is 'good' or 'bad'. That is, we use news sentiment as an explanatory variable to analyze how the tone of news shapes insider trading behavior. This way of measuring whether news is 'good' or 'bad' also provides a decisive advantage: While the company's situation is a given fact, executives do have flexibility in the scoping and wording of disclosures (Cheng & Lo 2006) . Thereby, the tone of news is a more direct measure of executives' intention than the abnormal stock price reaction around the news. The stock price reaction is also subject to the influence of other factors such as market's expectations on the company and the context of the news.
Second, we do not only consider news published shortly before or after insider trades, but also examine intertemporal relationships to news in the previous and following year.
Consequently, we establish an alternative measurement for management's expectation about future firm performance which is currently expressed by future earnings and future stock returns.
Third, we do not only consider management forecasts (as e.g. Cheng & Lo 2006 , Brockman et al. 2008 ), but also look at a diverse set of US news announcements archived by Reuters over 8 years. We also distinguish between corporate news issued by the company and 3rd-party news published by independent brokers and investment analysts.
Fourth, we further drill down into drivers of 'good' and 'bad' news and explain how confidence and uncertainty expressed in language impacts insider trading behavior.
We find that directors sell in years when their companies issue positive news and buy when their companies issue negative news. This behavior follows the stock market adage "Buy on bad news, sell on good news" and is consistent with Cheng & Lo (2006) . Analogously, for 3rd-party news, we find that insiders sell in years when news coverage is pleasant and buy when unpleasant. The impact of corporate news -being influenced by insiders -on insider trading is higher than for 3rd-party news. We also find that insiders buy when next year's news tone improves compared to the current year. Similarly, insiders also buy their companies' stock when news tone is worse than in the previous year. Thereby, insider trading is not only affected by 'good' or 'bad' news as a whole, but also by insecurity and uncertainty expressed in the language of the news.
The findings demonstrate how textual analysis can add significant value for applications in finance when textual data is available. Our findings also indicate that apparent contrarian trading strategies could as well be a consequence of executives' active manipulation of firmspecific information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses approaches for news sentiment analysis and our research design and methodology while Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 presents the main empirical findings and its implications. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
In this section, we introduce the data set and our research design that we use to explain insider trading behavior. We build on the research design proposed in Piotroski & Roulstone (2005) by introducing a sentiment variable to account for the tone of news issued by companies and 3rd-party providers. We start this section by describing the data set and variables for the regression analysis. Thereby, we first describe our response variable measuring insider trading. Having defined the essence of sentiment analysis, we elaborate on how different sentiment measures are included in our analysis. Lastly, we describe the control variables for our main regression and list descriptive statistics for our key variables. 
Data set

News Sentiment Analysis
In news sentiment analysis, written texts are associated with a particular numbered value or category in order to answer related research questions. Most sentiment approaches measure how market participants perceive and react upon important corporate news. Accordingly, the tone of the news and its relationship to stock price reactions are analyzed ; Li 2010a; Tetlock et al. 2008 ). Based on the stock price reactions following the announcement, news is classified into either positive or negative.
As written text is a form of unstructured information as compared with e.g. financial statements, it first has to be translated into a machine readable representation of the text 2 .
This step includes the identification of those words, which are most relevant and should thus represent the text. Second, a numerical metric needs to be calculated for each announcement as an aggregate based on the occurrences of the previously identified words. These two steps have to be performed for any kind of sentiment analysis. Li (2010a) distinguishes sentiment analyses into dictionary and statistical approaches.
The dictionary has a fixed set of words and often originates from a certain specific field, such as the Harvard-IV-4 psychosocial dictionary which is used by Tetlock et al. (2008 (Loughran & McDonald, 2011) . Furthermore, the simple dictionary-based approach explicitly ignores the context of the sentences. For instance, if a sentence is about cost, then the word ''increase'' qualifies it as being negative: However, it is likely to be a positive word if the sentence is about "revenue" (Li 2010a ). Lastly, some words fully change their sentiment depending on the specific domain they are used in. While "cancer" is a serious disease and labeled negative in the Harvard-IV-4 dictionary, it may be part of a positive message when a new drug for cancer treatment has been developed.
To mitigate these drawbacks, statistical approaches have been developed to account for correlations between specific keywords and the text type to classify the documents. This task is mostly performed by machine learning approaches (Li 2010b; Hagenau et al. 2012 ).
However, some approaches translate their results into quantifiable metrics which can be used for competitive comparison to dictionary approaches (Jegadeesh & Wu 2010, Liebmann et al.
2012).
For the statistical approach, all words in the document corpus have to be extracted first.
Some of these words will be occurring in almost all text messages (i.e. stopwords such as "the", "it", "like", "or"). Thus, they are of low informative value and need to be excluded from the analysis. Additionally, assuming that words with the same word stem convey the same or similar meaning, we employ the Porter Stemmer, as in Porter (1980) , which reduces inflected words to their stem. Subsequently, the most informative words for sentiment analysis out of the remaining words have to be selected 3 . For our explanation of insider trading activity, we focus on two dictionary based approaches and one statistical approach.
Most informative refers in particular to those words which help to discriminate between positive and negative news messages. If, for example, a word frequently occurs in both, positive and negative news messages, it is considered to contain less information. However, if a word occurs less frequently in the overall data set, but concentrates in either positive or negative news messages, it is considered to be informative. To determine whether a news message is positive or negative in an objective manner, abnormal stock price returns on the day the news was disclosed can be used to label the messages. Actual market returns are used to identify the most informative words. The market feedback however reflects the average interpretation of all acting market participants which significantly differ from using a predetermined dictionary as all words are selected that play a discriminating role in the given text corpus and thus do not miss out on relevant terms that the creator of a predetermined dictionary has not thought of.
In our empirical analysis, we use three different proxies for news sentiment, Tetlock-neg and calculation of the Tonality is described in more detail.
Sentiment metrics as described in the previous subsections calculate a sentiment value for each news message. As many different news messages are issued throughout the year, sentiment values have to be aggregated to form an annual sentiment value. We choose an annual timeframe because of the availability of control variables. Some of our control variables which are based on a company's financial reporting are only available on a quarterly basis, for some companies only on an annual basis. Additionally, choosing a quarterly timeframe would not only reduce the number of companies in the sample, but also decrease the number of available news per data point to one fourth.
For creating an aggregated annual sentiment, we average sentiment values of news messages for each firm and fiscal year. Each of the news in our sample meets certain requirements that we impose to eliminate irrelevant stories. We require that each story contains at least 20 words in total and at least 3 words from the respective wordlist of the employed sentiment approach (c.f. Tetlock et al. (2008)). We impose these word count filters to eliminate news that contain only tables or lists with quantitative information, and to limit the influence of outliers on our sentiment measures.
For creating a meaningful average, we also require a minimum of four news messages per fiscal year and firm. A higher number of news reduces noise and variability of the sentiment measure and thus generates results of higher confidence. This fact is further investigated in section 3.2 where we demonstrate the impact of different minimum values on the significance of results.
Measurement of Future Firm Performance and Contrarian Behaviour
For each fiscal year where insiders were trading, we measure the firm's future performance in 
Controlling for other factors affecting insider trading
Insiders' trading behavior is influenced by changes in their holdings due to the granting of respectively, scaled by total shares outstanding at year-end.
We also control for firm size (i.e. logarithm of total assets TA t ) for each firm-year.
Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
In this subsection, we provide descriptive statistics on the sample we used in this study. As a minimum number of news is required per firm-year observations to calculate a sentiment value, the availability of news determines the number of observations in our empirical analysis. As there is less 3rd-party news in the sample, we have fewer observations available for sentiment metrics based on 3rd-party news. For corporate news based metrics, we obtain 13,881 firm-year observations. For 3 rd -party news based metrics, we obtain 2,613
observations. Despite the different sample sizes, the distribution of these two subsets of news is very similar.
The Tonality sentiment measure based on corporate news shows more positive than Data availability for option exercises and grants is lower than for other control variables.
Specifically, only 2,606 data points have values for Tonality (Corporate news) and grants. For 3 rd -party news, the number decreases to 985 data points. Thus, we do not show option grants and exercises in our regression analyses, but use them for robustness checks only.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. 
Results
In this section, we demonstrate how news sentiment of both corporate news and 3 rd -party news contributes to the explanation of insider trading behavior. After showing the results for contemporaneous sentiment (i.e. this year's sentiment), we examine drivers for significance and also look into associations of intertemporal sentiment changes (i.e. changes between previous, current and next year's sentiment) and insider purchasing behavior. Lastly, we present the impact of confidence and uncertainty in language on insider trading activity.
Contemporary results
To analyze the association between contemporary sentiment and insider purchasing behavior, we use the three sentiment measures described in the previous section. This indicates that insiders sell in years when their companies issue positive news and insiders buy when their companies issue negative news. Analogously, for 3rd-party news, the negative coefficient indicates that insiders sell in years when news coverage is pleasant and buy when unpleasant. The correlation coefficient is significantly higher for corporate news.
This indicates that the impact of corporate news (which may be influenced by insiders themselves) on insider trading is higher than for 3rd-party news. Also Tetlock-neg for corporate news confirms the indications above. As Tetlock-neg expresses the negativity of news, the sign of the coefficient needs to be positive to confirm results. For 3rd-party news, the sign of Tetlock-neg's coefficient is not as expected. However, the correlation is not very strong. Comparing sentiment approaches, the regression also shows that Tonality based on both news types has the highest explanatory power.
The number of observations in the regression varies with the news type. As a minimum number of news is required per year and firm for calculating a sentiment value, the availability of news limits the number of observations. There is less 3 rd -party news in the sample, thus, fewer observations are available for sentiment metrics based on 3 rd -party news.
The intersection of both news types will lead to the lowest number of observations. we perform a set of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to compare the sentiment approaches against one another. Table 4 presents the results of all nine regression models for the prediction of purchase ratio PR t during fiscal year t.
We estimate all models with firm fixed effects allowing us to control for unobservable firm characteristics that may drive differences in trading behavior between firms (e.g. firmspecific insider trading policies or restrictions). The standard errors of the coefficients in all regressions are adjusted for clustering at the firm level to control for non-independence of observations within a firm. However, we cannot confirm this finding.
Estimations (2), (3), and (4) examine the association between sentiment of corporate news and insider purchasing behavior. Consistent with the unconditional results in Table 3 Similarly, estimations (5), (6) , and (7) examine the association between sentiment of 3 rdparty news and insider purchasing behavior. Consistent with the results in Table 3 and the estimation models based on corporate news sentiment, there is a relation between negative sentiment of 3 rd -party news coverage and insider purchasing activity and vice versa. This demonstrates our hypothesis that insiders are also influenced by 3 rd -party news in a way that they sell in years when news coverage is advantageous and buy when unpleasant. If sentiment metrics based on 3 rd -party news are included into the regression, the current firm performance (∆ROA_t) exhibits its expected behavior, i.e. the coefficient turns negative.
Comparing different sentiment metrics, the Tonality metric is most significant. As for the univariate regression Tetlock-neg based on 3 rd -party news is not significant and carries a different sign than expected. Comparing the different news types, corporate news lead to more significant sentiment metrics. In contrast to corporate news in estimation (4), Netoptimism is significantly related to purchase ratio. The respective word list seems to be better tailored to 3 rd -party news than to the language used in corporate news.
To even better compare the different news types, estimation (8) examines the association between Tonality sentiment on both corporate news and 3 rd -party news and insiders purchasing behavior. Essentially, Tonality based on corporate news is more significant than Tonality based on 3 rd -party news indicating that corporate news exhibit a higher influence on insider trading behavior than 3 rd -party news. As corporate news is subject to direct influence by the insiders, this also suggests that corporate news may be used to actively manipulate stock prices. Having both sentiment metrics significant demonstrates that the combination of both news types adds additional explanatory power. Thus, both news types each have an influence on insider trading behavior.
To corroborate the preceding results, control for omitted performance variables and compare the interactions between sentiment approaches and news types, we estimate a full model (estimation (9)) that includes all sentiment metrics for both news types. Tonality again proves to be the most significant sentiment metric with corporate news being more significant than 3rd-party news. The full model carries the highest explanatory power at R² = 9.9%.
Our analysis builds on the assumption that insiders trade after the news is published. Our results are robust to the inclusion of stock option grants and stock option exercises, i.e.
sign of coefficients stay the same and key tonality variables remain on similar significance levels. Still, they are not included as they drastically reduce the number of data points in our regressions due to lower data availability.
The sentiment metrics in this section were produced requiring a minimum of 4 news messages per firm year (i.e. medium confidence as denoted in section 3.2). The following section will analyze robustness and significance for different minima.
Increasing significance of results
In this section, we analyze two drivers for significance: First, we vary the number of news which we require as minimum per firm and year to calculate a Tonality average. If there is less news in a firm-year, no Tonality average is calculated and the data point is omitted from the regression. We denote the different thresholds as different confidence levels (i.e. low, medium, and high). If more news messages contribute to the Tonality average per firm and year, the average should reduce variability and the impact of outliers. Second, we analyze the effect of different news types within the set of corporate news. In addition to metrics based on all corporate news, we also base our sentiment metrics on financial results only, which make up two-thirds of our corporate news data set. Other news categories may not be analyzed separately as number of observations would become too low.
We perform nine separate regression models: One regression for each of the three confidence levels and each of the three news categories (i.e. all corporate news, corporate financial results, 3 rd -party news). Table 5 presents the results of all nine regression models for the prediction of purchase ratio PR t during fiscal year t. This table presents estimated coefficients of the OLS regressions with firm fixed effects to explain insider purchasing activity. t-statistics are listed in parentheses. Sentiment metrics are based on all corporate news, corporate financial results (a subset of the previous one), and 3 rd -party news, respectively. Standard errors of the coefficients are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Tonality is calculated for different confidence levels, i.e. low confidence requires at least one news message per firm-year, medium confidence requires a minimum of 4 messages while high requires 7 messages. For 3 rd -party news, high confidence only requires 5 news messages due to lower data availability. All other variables are as defined in section 2. Significance is denoted at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
News Focus All Corp. All Corp. All Corp. For all corporate news, significance of associations between purchasing activity and Tonality increases with the confidence level (estimations (1), (2), and (3)). This suggests that increasing confidence reduces noise and limits the impact of outliers. Still, lowest confidence (i.e. only one news message per firm-year) already exhibits significant relation (estimation (1)) showing the robustness of results. Significance of relations between purchasing activity and sentiment further increases when Tonality is based on financial results only instead of the full set of corporate news (estimations (4), (5), and (6)). Financial results seem to transport more relevant content explaining insider trading than the average news. This is consistent with Tetlock et al. (2008) who find that stories about fundamentals predict earnings and returns more effectively than other stories. However, another possible explanation might also be that it is just easier to influence and adjust the tone in financial results than in other news.
Fin. Results
Fin. Results 3rd-party 3rd-party 3rd-party
It is important to note that the number of observations significantly increases with lower required confidence -we witness twice as many data points for low confidence compared to high confidence.
Tonality based on 3 rd -party news also benefits from medium confidence compared to low confidence (estimations (7) and (8)). However, Tonality based on 3 rd -party news does not benefit from high confidence (estimation (9)) which could be attributed to the lower number of news in the 3 rd -party sample.
Intertemporal results
While the previous sections only considered contemporaneous Tonality, this section looks at tone changes between the previous, current, and following year. In the same manner as future firm performance is measured by MARET t+1 and ∆ROA t+1 , the future tone of news is also of importance. As MARET (market adjusted return) and ∆ROA (delta return on assets) are relative measures for the change between two subsequent years, Tonality is also calculated as the delta between two subsequent years. ∆Tonality t+1 is calculated as the difference between the next and the current year while ∆Tonality t is the difference between the current and the previous year. For this analysis, we focus on the Tonality metric only as this sentiment metric showed the strongest relation between tone of news and insider purchasing activity in previous regressions of this paper.
We perform nine separate regression models: Three for each news categories (i.e. all corporate news, corporate financial results, 3 rd -party news). Within each of the three news categories, we run the current delta-Tonality, the future delta-Tonality and the combination of both. Table 6 presents the results of all nine regression models for the prediction of purchase ratio PR t during fiscal year t. 
All other variables are as defined in section 2. Significance is denoted at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level, respectively.
(
News Focus All Corp. All Corp. All Corp. Estimations (1), (2), and (3) examine the association between Tonality changes based on all corporate news and insider purchasing behavior. ∆Tonality t is negatively related while ∆Tonality t+1 is positively associated with purchasing activity. This demonstrates that insiders buy on both worsening news between last and current year and improving news between the current and next year. The observation reconfirms that insiders trade on superior knowledge about future earnings innovations and future stock returns (Piotroski & Roulstone 2005) . The relation of purchasing activity to ∆Tonality t is stronger than to ∆Tonality t+1 (estimation (3)) showing that impact of existing news is stronger than expected future news. While insiders profit from their superior knowledge about future earnings and returns, existing news -with direct impact on stock prices -still seem to be the stronger driver for insider purchasing behavior than future news.
Fin. Results
Fin
Estimations (4), (5), and (6) examine association between Tonality changes based on financial results only and insider purchasing behavior. They confirm the results based on all corporate results, but exhibit slightly stronger relationships. Again, our sentiment metrics based on financial results seem to be more relevant.
The analysis is repeated for 3 rd -party news (estimations (7), (8) , and (9)). Thereby, ∆Tonality t is still negatively related (positively related for ∆Tonality t+1 ), but not significant any more. In particular, the combination of both time horizons in estimation (9) shows that ∆Tonality t+1 is more strongly associated to insider purchasing activity than for ∆Tonality t . This indicates that insiders also buy on improving 3 rd -party news coverage. In contrast to corporate news emitted by the company, the improving news coverage is more important than the change to the previous year. A possible explanation may be that 3 rd -party news cannot be directly influenced by executives and mirror actual development and condition of the company in a reflected manner.
Relating insider trading to confidence and uncertainty in news
Literature does not only provide dictionaries for the tone of news, but also for other forms of expression (Loughran & MacDonald 2011 We perform three separate regression models -one for each word category. Table 7 presents the results of the regression models for the prediction of purchase ratio PR t during fiscal year t. Estimation (1) examines the association between uncertainty and insider purchasing behavior. There is a strong positive relation between uncertainty and a high insider purchasing activity. We also observe a positive relation between weak_modal and purchasing activity. This indicates that insiders buy when expressing insecurity and uncertainty.
Insecurity and uncertainty is also a form of 'bad' news driving down stock prices so that insiders' purchases are more likely to be profitable.
Strong_modal is also positively associated to purchasing behavior (estimation (2)). However, the relation is weaker than for uncertainty and weak_modal. Despite the weaker relation, it
indicates that insiders buy their firms' stocks in those years when they influenced the tone of published news to appear confidently. This finding is related to research of Larcker & Zakolyukina (2012) who demonstrate that CEOs influence company publications (such as analyst conference calls) for their own purpose by using "fewer anxiety words". The actual number of observations is low as the word list is short and contained words that occur less frequently.
Conclusion
We examine reported insider trading behavior and explain the association between corporate as well as 3rd-party news announcements on directors' dealings activity. Our main contribution is to extend previous approaches by adding the sentiment of news to the research setting. Our analysis is based on a comprehensive set of US corporate disclosures and 3 rdparty news from Reuters between 2003 and 2010.
The empirical analysis demonstrates that not only financial forecasting, but also the explanation of insider trading behavior can be augmented by measuring qualitative information in financial news. Our augmented approach delivered a more differentiated explanation of director's dealings than previous approaches through adding qualitative information. In detail, analysis reveals that insiders sell in years when their company issues positive news and buy when the company issues negative news. Further, insiders are also influenced by 3 rd -party news. They sell their securities in years when news coverage about their company is pleasant and buy securities when news coverage is less pleasant. Thereby, the impact of corporate news, which may be influenced by insiders themselves, on insider transactions is higher than for 3rd-party news. Insiders seem to care more about the news they may influence themselves than about independent 3 rd -party analysis. We also find that insiders tend to buy on both worsening news between last and current year and improving news between the current and next year. By using textual analysis, the finding reconfirms that insiders trade on superior knowledge about future earnings innovations and future stock returns. Observations also support that insiders purchase their companies' stocks when using language of uncertainty and of distinct high or weak confidence.
By analyzing different news categories, we find that financial results seem to transport more relevant content explaining insider trading behavior than the average news. It might be also easier to influence and adjust the tone in financial results than in other news. Our findings also indicate insiders do not only follow an apparent contrarian trading strategy, but also could actively manipulate disclosures and firm-specific information.
Implications of this paper are manifold: First, our analysis demonstrates a vivid example how finance may benefit from textual analysis. Application of textual analysis in finance is not limited to stock price and volatility predictions, but may also be used in other areas as long as comprehensive qualitative information is available. Second, our study is also relevant to financial investment managers. Analysis indicates that investment managers have to either respond very quickly to news announcements (i.e. using automated news trading) or very carefully, as they might lose return when trading after news is already factored into the stock price. It might be necessary to trade the contrarian strategy of insiders: To buy on bad news and to sell on good news. Our analysis also highlights the need for automated analysis of news to control for content that is used for manipulation of stock markets. Lastly, the regulator needs to secure that news announcements are not abused by insiders in companies to influence the stock market for their own purposes.
